I think, Noel Maurer has not spent enough time thinking about the implications of Noel Maurer's work.
What you are missing is that unpredictability, essentially, means that no agreements on sharing the rent from cooperation with the US can be worth much: at any point the US government can abrogate it under the slimmest of provocations. Of course, that, in turn, implies that the actual cost of refusing to cooperate has already gone sharply down: we are fucked if we don't, but we are equally screwed if we do. Once that is recognized: and, methinks, it will be recognized pretty soon, given the last few days - nobody has any reason to cooperate. In fact, if an American country attempts to, the newly predatory US may be assumed to be unable to commit to not trying to grab the entire surplus. Given that, the national consolidatoin against the gringo-imposed humiliation becomes not only natural, but also quite costless in effect.
Of course, Noel Maurer would have suggested that, given that the US can no longer commit to no predation, one should try to look for a "third force" that could be paid off with some of the surplus to make predation either unfeasible or, at least, costly. Viewed from that standpoint, China may actually play a positive role in the US relationships with the rest of the hemisphere: or else, US might be able play a positive role in the Chinese relationships with the same. Of course, that would only be a second-best - but the first-best is no longer on offer.
> In the long-run, I think the move to open coercion will be an own-goal for the United States. Other than making Greenland a territory and getting Central American cooperation on migration—which do not require the exercise of outright coercion—the administration’s demands seem counterproductive.
I wonder if you might be underestimating the losses to the United States in the longer haul, part the likely four-year horizon of the second Trump administration.
Dreams of hemispheric integration have been buried; it turns out that North American continentalism, even, was a bad bet for the United States' smaller neighbours. Even the trade agreement that Trump himself negotiated the first time he was in power turns out to have been a bad deal, and, too often, you get Americans who position themselves as neutral on Trump or even opposing Trump supporting his goals. The United States cannot be trusted.
Meanwhile, the different states of Latin America all have rather more autonomy, de jure and otherwise, than Soviet satellite states did in the Cold War. Even Cuba and Venezuela, countries that are run by regimes hostile to the United States and allied with American enemies, which have produced substantial diasporas in the United States invested in supporting Trump, have gotten away without invasions. If Soviet satellite states in the later Cold War were cautiously investigating non-Soviet options for trade as much as they could under the direct shadow of Moscow, Latin American countries can be expected to do the same.
The net outcome of all of this aggression misdirected towards allies, even friends, will bet net losses. The United States' neighbours will lose out from the effective nonexistence of the US as a trustworthy partner and friend, of course, more so than a United States larger and wealthier than any of these, but the US will lose out too. This will be all the more clear if the US decides to go beyond threats and grandstanding to actually attack another Latin American country. Unless the United States decides to try to Warsaw Pact the hemisphere—something pretty unlikely, I hasten to add—Trump will have caused pretty substantial and irreversible losses for the US in this hemisphere.
Who knew that the American Century would be liable to end at the United States' own hands. Who knew that it would end so stupidly.
I think, Noel Maurer has not spent enough time thinking about the implications of Noel Maurer's work.
What you are missing is that unpredictability, essentially, means that no agreements on sharing the rent from cooperation with the US can be worth much: at any point the US government can abrogate it under the slimmest of provocations. Of course, that, in turn, implies that the actual cost of refusing to cooperate has already gone sharply down: we are fucked if we don't, but we are equally screwed if we do. Once that is recognized: and, methinks, it will be recognized pretty soon, given the last few days - nobody has any reason to cooperate. In fact, if an American country attempts to, the newly predatory US may be assumed to be unable to commit to not trying to grab the entire surplus. Given that, the national consolidatoin against the gringo-imposed humiliation becomes not only natural, but also quite costless in effect.
Of course, Noel Maurer would have suggested that, given that the US can no longer commit to no predation, one should try to look for a "third force" that could be paid off with some of the surplus to make predation either unfeasible or, at least, costly. Viewed from that standpoint, China may actually play a positive role in the US relationships with the rest of the hemisphere: or else, US might be able play a positive role in the Chinese relationships with the same. Of course, that would only be a second-best - but the first-best is no longer on offer.
> In the long-run, I think the move to open coercion will be an own-goal for the United States. Other than making Greenland a territory and getting Central American cooperation on migration—which do not require the exercise of outright coercion—the administration’s demands seem counterproductive.
I wonder if you might be underestimating the losses to the United States in the longer haul, part the likely four-year horizon of the second Trump administration.
Dreams of hemispheric integration have been buried; it turns out that North American continentalism, even, was a bad bet for the United States' smaller neighbours. Even the trade agreement that Trump himself negotiated the first time he was in power turns out to have been a bad deal, and, too often, you get Americans who position themselves as neutral on Trump or even opposing Trump supporting his goals. The United States cannot be trusted.
Meanwhile, the different states of Latin America all have rather more autonomy, de jure and otherwise, than Soviet satellite states did in the Cold War. Even Cuba and Venezuela, countries that are run by regimes hostile to the United States and allied with American enemies, which have produced substantial diasporas in the United States invested in supporting Trump, have gotten away without invasions. If Soviet satellite states in the later Cold War were cautiously investigating non-Soviet options for trade as much as they could under the direct shadow of Moscow, Latin American countries can be expected to do the same.
The net outcome of all of this aggression misdirected towards allies, even friends, will bet net losses. The United States' neighbours will lose out from the effective nonexistence of the US as a trustworthy partner and friend, of course, more so than a United States larger and wealthier than any of these, but the US will lose out too. This will be all the more clear if the US decides to go beyond threats and grandstanding to actually attack another Latin American country. Unless the United States decides to try to Warsaw Pact the hemisphere—something pretty unlikely, I hasten to add—Trump will have caused pretty substantial and irreversible losses for the US in this hemisphere.
Who knew that the American Century would be liable to end at the United States' own hands. Who knew that it would end so stupidly.